Introduction
For more than twenty years, European stock markets have been experiencing important and significant financial and legal reforms, especially since 1992. Since the «Big Bang» in 1986, they have been characterized by a permanent and continuous integration. Legal and institutional barriers have been removed, and seem to belong to a distant past. Since the late 1990s, a continuous growing number of European firms has been adopting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to disclose their performance to shareholders and investors.
In this context of financial integration and global accounting harmonization, and despite or because of recent financial scandals all around the world, earnings financial analysts' forecasts (hereafter referred to as FAFs) are more than ever a crucial topic for capital markets researchers and investors. As Acknowledged by Kothari (2001) «almost all models of valuation either directly or indirectly use earnings forecast» 1 . FAFs' accuracy is indeed an important input to capital budgeting and investment decisions.
Forecast accuracy is defined as the absolute earnings forecast error. Much work has been dedicated to the accuracy, with research in the field focusing largely on the U.S. market.
Among the most documented determinants of the quality of FAFs are earnings type -profits vs. losses, increases vs. decreases - (Dowen, 1996; Ciccone, 2005) , the business activities of the firm (Dunn and Nathan, 1998) , the economic situation (Chopra, 1998) , the forecast horizon (Richardson et al., 1999) , the industrial sector (Brown, 1997) , and the competence of analysts (Mikhail et al., 1997) . Most of these studies provide U.S. evidence of the accuracy of FAFs, generally focusing on a single determinant. They do not allow a proper evaluation of the accuracy of FAFs in different environments. Recently, some articles have taken an interest in FAFs around the world, and shown significant differences in their respective accuracy levels (Hope, 2003; Ang and Ciccone, 2001; Chang et al., 2000; Capstaff et al., 1998) . Studies led by Allen et al. (1999) , Chang et al. (2000) , Ang and Ciccone (2001) , Black and Carnes (2001) , among others, document that accounting, legal and economic systems tend to have an important impact on the accuracy of forecasts. The accounting, legal and institutional environments are the most obvious country-related determinants of the accuracy of FAFs. Beyond the type of earnings effect largely documented in the U.S., these studies highlight the importance of country and industry effects. Although Hope (2003) shows that firm-specific factors (profits vs. losses or increases vs. decreases) are the most important in explaining the characteristics of FAFs, international studies on the determinants of forecast errors focus almost exclusively on the different aspects of the country effect. Therefore, we intend to analyze the relative importance of country-, industry-and firmspecific effects in explaining the cross-sectional variance in FAF errors on European financial markets. 3 The question is nonetheless a fundamental one for financial analysts, international investors, and capital markets researchers. Cavaglia, Brightham, and Aked (2000) provide evidence that sector factors became more important determinants of the stock returns of developed countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The international portfolios of developed stock markets could be structured in the near future along the sector dimension rather than along the traditional country dimension. Nevertheless, the relative importance of country vs industry factors is an important unsettled issue. 4 While Brooks and Del Negro (2004) argue that the rising importance of industry factors relative to country factors is a temporary phenomenon associated with the stock market fluctuations, Moerman (2008) , focusing on Euro area stock markets, finds strong evidence that «diversification over industries yields more efficient portfolios than diversification over countries». Ferreira and Ferreira (2006) document that the dominance of the country effect has diminished, while the industry effect has increased on European stock markets. countries from the Euro-zone and outside, which have experienced significant international 4 We may mention Carrieri et al. (2004) and especially Adjaoute and Danthine (2004) , and Hargis and Mei (2006 Section 2 presents and justifies our conceptual framework for analyzing FAFs accuracy during the period. Section 3 describes the data source and forecast error measures used in the analysis. We describe the methodology employed in section 4, and present results in section 5. In section 6, we summarise our main results.
Determinants of FAF
To answer the three main questions mentioned in the previous section, we suggest two steps.
First, we analyze the average relative importance of country-, industry-, and firm-specific effects (type of earnings, increase or decrease in earnings, analyst coverage) in explaining cross-sectional differences in FAF errors. Secondly, we scrutinize the evolution of the relative importance of each class of determinants in explaining variations across FAF errors.
Country-, Industry-, and Firm-specific Effects

Country effects
Studies on many countries show sharp contrasts in the accuracy of FAFs. Chang et al. (2000) obtain an average absolute forecast error of 25.5% for the 47 countries in their sample: from 2.3% for the U.S. to 71.2% for Slovakia. Ang and Ciccone (2001) , with a sample of 42 countries and covering the period of 1988 to 1997, give another illustration of this significant diversity of accuracy, with an average absolute forecast error of 60% and a dispersion of 31%. The results of Capstaff et al. (2001) and Higgings (1998) , for Europe, and Allen et al. (1997) , Black and Carnes (2001) and Coën and Desfleurs (2004) , for Asia, and for different time horizons, demonstrate that the accuracy of financial analysts for countries of the same geographic region may be very contrasted.
These studies tend to confirm the existence and the important weight of country effects. We may wonder what their sources are. As shown by Allen et al. (1999) , and Ang and Ciccone (2001) , the level of development is not the most relevant explanation. The country effect has many origins. Some factors are macroeconomic. In their study on Pacific Basin markets in the early '90s, Allen et al. (1999) Moreover, they add that forecasts are all the more accurate since such countries show a significant openness to foreign business and foreign direct investments. On the contrary, forecasts tend to be less accurate in countries with a high level of governmental intervention, with a high level of corruption, and with a less competitive environment.
Following Chopra (1998), we may add that financial analysts are more accurate in an environment characterised by stable growth than in one experiencing a sharply accelerating or decelerating business cycle.
The legal and institutional environments may also have a significant influence on FAFs. Chang et al. (2000) show that there are significantly fewer forecast errors and that they are significantly smaller in countries with common English legal systems, offering a high protection for minority shareholders. 5 Furthermore, the financing structure and its consequences on the disclosure of information may tend to influence the accuracy of 7 Although these factors are not the most important, they are to be considered. See Ang and Ciccone (2001) for a discussion.
financial analysts. The use of debt to finance operating activities decreases the number of players in the markets, and may stem the disclosure of information. In countries with high levels of intermediation, the circulation of information between the borrower and the lender is more encouraged, often to the detriment of shareholders and analysts.
According to a growing body of literature, accounting and fiscal system characteristics tend to be quite influential. Hope (2003) shows that there is a positive relation between the level of information disclosure and the level of the accuracy of FAFs. An improvement of information quality should decrease the dispersion of forecast errors. Basu et al. (1998) underscore the fact that forecast errors are smaller in an environment offering a vast range of accounting methods. Black and Carnes (2002) argue that the development of accounting systems is influenced by the idiosyncratic cultural features of different countries. FAFs are more accurate since the accounting system has been marked by a British inheritance (Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore).
Empirical evidence suggests analyzing other effects, such as industry-, and firm-specific effects.
Industry effects.
In most studies devoted to the accuracy of FAFs within a given country, the diversity of the industrial structure is taken into account as a control variable (see O'Brien (1998) , and Sinha, Brown and Das (1997) , among others). Paradoxically, many international studies neglect this feature (see Black and Carnes (2002) for Asia, or Ang and Ciccone (2001) for a larger sample of countries). The industrial structure sharply differs from one country to the next. Differences in the quality of FAFs attributable to country effects may therefore be due to differences in industrial structures, and it is therefore important to control for industry effects in explaining cross-sectional differences in quality.
It exists indeed a large body of empirical evidence attesting to the importance of industry effects. For Europe during the period of 1987 to 1994, Capstaff et al. (2001) observe that forecasts for the public utilities and health care sectors are more accurate. By contrast, they are less accurate for the transportation and consumer durables sectors. Brown (1997) confirms these industry differences in the U.S., where analysts demonstrate a significant over-optimism in 11 out of 14 sectors. In Asia, the results of Jaggi and Jain (1998) show that there are smaller forecast errors in the public service sectors than in the private industrial sectors. They attribute this result to the low earnings volatility that exists in public service sectors.
The influence of the industrial sector on financial analysts' accuracy may be related to the stability of the firms in the sector. The earnings of firms evolving in stable sectors should tend to be easier to forecast, while sectors subject to external factors would tend to be difficult to analyze. This is the case of the natural resources sector, where earnings are sensitive to the variability of prices. 6 According to Luttman and Silhan (1995) , the level of competitiveness may affect earnings and the characteristics of the disclosed information. To forecast earnings, analysts must consider a firm's strategy and its suitability with respect to the evolution of competitiveness. As suggested by Katz et al. (2000) , these differences in competitive environments may have repercussions on the ability of financial analysts to forecast the earnings of firms in contrasted sectors.
Accounting factors, already mentioned to justify the country effect, may also be interpreted to constitute a sector or industry effect. As studied by DeFond and Hung (2003) , the choice of accounting systems or methods available depends on the industry. For example, firms in the oil and mining sectors may use either the successful-effort method or the full-cost effort to account for exploration costs. Moreover, the level of information disclosure and transparency differs, and evolves differently as we go from one industry to the next. For a sample of countries, including emerging Asian countries, Patel et al. (2002) note a 15% improvement in the level of disclosure from 1998 to 2000 for the industrial sector, while the improvement reaches only 4% in the public service and information technology sectors.
Such differences in evolution may explain the variations observed in the quality of FAFs by sectors.
Firm-specific effects
While many studies on the determinants of the accuracy and bias of FAFs focus almost exclusively on the different aspects of the country factor, especially differences in accounting systems, industry factors and firm-specific factors are neglected. Elton et al. (1984) show that firm-specific components are relevant to analyze the accuracy of FAFs and the diagnosis of errors. We concentrate on two firm-specific factors: earnings-specific factors (profits/losses, and earnings increases/decreases) and analyst following.
Profits/Losses and Increases/Decreases Effects
There is extensive evidence suggesting that FAFs tend to be often optimistic. Practice shows that it seems easier to forecast profits than losses and earnings increases than earnings decreases. These stylized facts have led to many studies: incentive-based and cognitivebased explanations.
Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999) , Dechow et al. (2000) and more recently Bradshaw et al. (2006) offer evidence that analysts have private incentive originating in business relationships or in their dependence on managers for information to compromise their objectivity and optimiscally bias their forecasts. Because of the compensation they receive for their service, «sell-side» analysts working for an investment banking firm (called affiliated analysts) tend to issue more optimistic forecasts than unaffiliated analysts. Besides, as pointed out by Lim (2001) and Das et al. (1998) , the motivation to gain access to information from management could be an explanation of optimistic FAFs, especially when information asymmetry is high. Conroy and Harris (1995) show that financial analysts who do not have to make buy recommendations tend to make more accurate forecasts, particularly for earnings decreases. Gu and Wu (2003) , and Basu and Markov (2004) argue that analysts exhibit linear loss functions and minimize mean absolute forecast error. Optimistic bias seems rational in presence of earnings skewness. According to Hope (2003) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) management's incentive to take earnings «baths» could contribute to explain the observed optimistic bias in FAFs. The results reported by Loh and Mian (2002) indicate that firms in Singapore took advantage of the 1997 financial crisis to withdraw some assets from their balance sheets, leading to significant gaps between reported and forecast earnings.
An important literature is devoted to cognitive-bias explanations for analysts' optimism and is based on behavioural theories initiated by Tversky and Kahneman (1984) . For example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) demonstrate that financial analysts overreact to good earnings information and underreact to bad earnings information. Capstaff et al. (1998) on forecasts in Germany, report that forecast errors are much smaller for earnings increases than for decreases. There is a small negative bias for increases but a large positive bias for earnings decreases. According to Daniel et al. (1998) , analysts are overconfident in their private information, and revise imperfectly their anticipations especially after bad earnings information. As acknowledged by Kothari (2001) Moreover, as mentioned by Ang and Ciccone (2001) , the type of earnings (profits vs. losses)
should be a major determinant of the accuracy of FAFs.
Analyst Following Effect
Alford and Berger (1999) suggest that a significant number of analysts following a firm should induce an increase in competitiveness and an improvement in the accuracy of FAFs.
They document a strong positive relation between the size effect and the analyst following. Brown (1998) shows that FAFs are more accurate and rational for large cap firms covered by an important number of analysts. We expect to see a positive relation between the accuracy of analysts and the number of analysts following a given firm.
Sample selection and variable definitions
Measures of errors
We define a FAF error as the difference between forecast earnings and the actual reported earnings, standardized by the absolute value of actual reported earnings. The mean of the absolute forecast error provides summary information on accuracy. For each firm i and each fiscal year t (t=1 to 17), we compute the forecast error at various points in time, from 1 to h (h = 1 to 9) months prior the earnings report date. The nine-month horizon ensures that analysts know the previous year's earnings when making their forecasts. We therefore obtain 9×17 FAF errors per firm (17 FAF errors per firm for each horizon). The definition of |FERE| is given in equations (1) 
where RE i,t and FE i,h,t are respectively the reported (actual) earnings of firm i for fiscal year t and the consensus analysts' forecast of the firm's year t earnings made h months before the earnings report date.
Data
We obtain analysts' earnings forecasts from the international Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. We select 13 countries in our sample: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The sample period covers fiscal years 1990 to 2006.
All forecasts are earnings per share forecasts for the current fiscal year, with I/B/E/S continuing to provide forecasts until a firm's annual financial results are announced. We select earnings forecasts made from nine months to one month prior to the earnings report date. This horizon ensures that analysts have the past year's annual report, and thus the previous year's earnings figures, available to them when making their forecasts. We use the mean forecast as the consensus forecast, but impose the condition that at least three analysts follow the firm (Chang et al., 2000) . Data are then adjusted to eliminate potential biased and/or extreme situations. Extreme values in forecast errors may be caused by data errors or by transitory factors specific to a firm (for example takeovers, mergers and acquisitions or important restructurings). Following Capstaff et al. (1998) , to prevent the results from becoming contaminated by outliers, all absolute forecast errors exceeding 100% are removed. After eliminating extreme data, our final sample includes 224001 forecasts. All conclusions are similar if median forecasts are used instead of mean forecasts. [Please insert Figures 1A and 1B] Figures 1A, 1B and 1C show the evolution of absolute forecast error per country and industry. For the sake of clarity, we only present four 9 of the 13 countries and four of the eleven industries, respectively. We observe sharp differences among countries. The accuracy is continuously lowest in the U.K. By contrast, the accuracy is very volatile in 9 France, Germany, Sweden and U.K. one for each accounting legal system: French, German, Scandinavian and English accounting systems.
Sweden. While the evolution of the forecast accuracy in France shows a relatively smooth trend, it is more volatile in Germany. This figure is an illustration that FAFs seem definitely to be more accurate with common English legal systems, as suggested by Chang et al. (2000) . To confirm this point, we report the evolution of the accuracy by accounting system (English, French, German and Scandinavian) for our sample of 13 European countries 10 .
Significant disparities also exist among industries. Public Utilities are characterized by the lowest average forecast accuracy among all the industries; however, its forecast accuracy 
Methodology
To answer our three aforementioned questions, we use a methodology initially developed by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998) to decompose financial returns in industry and country components. This two-step procedure allows us to analyze the relative importance of country-, industry-and firm-specific effects in explaining the cross-sectional variations in FAF errors. In the first step, we estimate the model, and in the second, we decompose the variance to identify and measure the relative importance of each effect.
Step 1: Estimation of country-, industry-, and firm-specific effects
We first define |FERE i,h,,t | as financial analysts' forecast error on reported earnings for firm i for horizon h and fiscal year t. Then, we regress the |FEREs| on dummy variables standing for countries, industries, profits or losses, increases or decreases in earnings, and analyst 10 The repartition is the following: English accounting system: United Kingdom; French accounting system: Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain; German accounting system: Austria, Germany and Switzerland; Scandinavian accounting system: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
following. Since our sample comprises 13 countries and 11 industries, we define the following dummies: S ij and C ik . S ij is equal to 1 if security i belongs to industry j (j = 1,…,11) and is 0 otherwise. C ik is equal to 1 if security i belongs to country k (k = 1,…,13) and is 0 otherwise. We introduce the dummy, RE ig , for the type of reported earnings to be forecast. RE i1 is equal to 1 if the reported earnings for security i are positive, and is 0 otherwise. RE i2 is equal to 1 if the reported earnings for security i are negative, and is 0 otherwise. We add another series of dummies to take into account the direction of the variations of the earnings to be forecast, V if . V i1 is equal to 1 if there is there is an increase in earnings, and is 0 otherwise; V i2 is equal to 1 if there is a decrease in earnings, and is 0 otherwise. We also introduce a dummy to take into account the size effect or number of analysts effect, Ν iy (y = 1, ..., 4). Ν iy is equal to 1 if security i is included in category y. We define four categories for all the securities in our sample: securities followed by three to five analysts, securities followed by six to nine analysts, securities followed by ten to fifteen analysts, and securities followed by sixteen or more analysts.
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following model 
Because of perfect multi-collinearity between the regressors, we cannot directly estimate equation (2). Following the method initiated by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) , we impose, for each fiscal year t and each horizon h, restrictions to solve this over-identification problem.
14 To simplify the notation subscripts related to forecast horizon h and fiscal year t have not been reported in this equation. (3,a,b,c,d,e) where n j , m k , l g , w f , and z y stand respectively for the number of firms in industry j and in country k, the number of firms for which the type of reported earnings g (positive or negative) has encountered a variation f ( increase or decrease), and the number of firms followed by a number of analysts belonging to category y.
12
These constraints make it easier to interpret the coefficients. Instead of arbitrarily choosing a country-, industry-, or firm-specific benchmark, the intercept αˆ, stands as the average forecast error of our sample of developed countries, and each country-,industry-, or firm- 
Step 2: Analysis of variance
We decompose the cross-sectional variance (VT) 13 of forecast errors for our sample of European countries to analyze the relative importance of the error determinants on the European stock markets. Through the decomposition of (VT), we shed light on the proportion of variance caused by country factors (VC/VT), by industry factors (VS/VT), by 12 We can make an analogy with Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) . We use here the number of firms in the different sub-samples, whereas Heston and Rouwenhorst use the value weights in industry j and country k in the European value-weighted markets, and the number of assets in industry j and country k in the European equally-weighted markets. The number of firms is relevant and appropriate in our context of |FEREs| because observations are equally-weighted. 13 VT is an acronym for total variance:Variance and Total. VI: idiosyncratic variance.
the type of earnings -profits or losses (VRE/VT)-and variations in earnings -increases or decreases(VV/VT) -, by the number of analysts following a security (VN/VT), and by the idiosyncratic features (VI/VT), where VT h,t = VC h,t + VS h,t + VRE h,t + VV h,t + VN h,t + VI h,t is
the total effect for fiscal year t and horizon h.
14 First, to assess the relative importance of each effect over the whole 17-years period, we decompose the total variance using panel data analysis over the 17 years, nine forecast horizons and number of firms analyzed. Secondly, we examine the evolution of the relative importance of each effect on a year-by-year basis, using panel data analysis over the nine forecast horizons and number of firms considered.
Empirical results and analysis
The analysis of the distribution of FAF errors shows significant differences among countries and industries. What are the origins of these differences? The decomposition of the crosssectional variance of forecast errors into country effects, industry effects, earnings-specific effects, and analyst following effects sheds light on the influence of each effect on the level of error and on the level of financial analysts' bias.
5.1
Step 1: estimation of effects Table 2 shows the results of the first step of our methodology: the results of the regression of forecast errors, |FERE|, on dummies to capture the different effects, using equation (2) 17 For example, the contribution of country effects to the total variance, for each fiscal year t and horizon h, is measured as follows:
The model offers an incomplete decomposition of the variance. As acknowledged in the literature, the covariance terms between country-, industry-and firmspecific effects are very small, and can be reasonably neglected Rouwenhorst, 1994 and Griffin and Karolyi, 1998) . We proceed in a similar manner for the other components. Observations are equally-weighted. and constraints (3a) to (3e). We report and comment the results of the regression for |FEREs| one month prior the earnings report date.
15
Results from Table 2 on the relative importance of countries and industries are in line with those previously reported. As mentioned earlier, the intercept,α , stands as the average forecast error of our sample of 13 developed countries. The adjusted R squared is 19.44%, and is higher than the one reported by other studies firm specific effect and especially earnings-specific effects (See Hope (2003)). Thus, we focus on the types of earnings effects and on the analyst coverage effects. Estimated coefficients reported in Table 2A show that |FEREs| are much larger when companies report losses than when they report profits (18.2%
vs. -1.7%). Consistently also, financial analysts tend to make larger errors when earnings decrease than when earnings increase: +4.0% vs. -2.0 %. As expected, the more significant the analyst firm coverage, the smaller the absolute forecasting errors. For firms followed by more than 15 analysts, the estimated coefficient is -3.3%, whereas it is 2.8% for firms followed by less than 5 analysts.
[Please insert Table 2] 
Step 2: Decomposition of variances in forecast errors
An analysis of the decomposition of variances in forecast errors sheds light on the relative importance of each class of determinants. The variances of the different effects are reported in Table 3 .
We show in table 3A that the sign (profits or losses) and the variation (increases or decreases) of reported earnings respectively account for 42.54% (9.81% of VT) and 25.85% (5.93% of VT) of the explained cross-sectional variance of absolute forecasting errors (20.83% of VT). The third determinant, at 18.91% (4.36% of VT), is the country incorporation. Country effects largely dominate industry effects, (5.94% and 1.37% of VT) and the number of analysts' effect (6.81% and 1.57% of VT). These results have significant consequences on the analysis and understanding of the behaviour of financial analysts. They tend to prove that earnings-specific factors represent much more important factors in explaining the magnitude of forecasting errors than the country or industry effects. Financial analysts make more accurate forecasts when earnings increase and are positive, and have «difficulties» forecasting earnings decreases and losses or at least other motivations described in previous sections (see incentive-based and cognitive-based explanations).
Moreover, we note that industry effects are less relevant than the number of analysts' effect.
[Please insert Table 3]
In Table 4 , we shed a new light on the annual evolution of the decomposition of the variance of |FEREs| over the 17-years period covered. For absolute forecast errors, |FEREs|, the type of earnings -profits vs. losses -is generally the main driver in explaining the crosssectional variation of earnings forecast errors, while the earnings variation is the second driver, except in 1990 and 1998 (with a reverse in the hierarchy) and in 1997 when the pure country effect is the best factor (8.57% of VT). Country and industry effects are much lower.
For the accuracy metric, country effects always significantly dominate industry effects:
4.36% vs. 1.37% for the period. Country effects represent 2.18% of the cross-sectional variance in earnings absolute forecasts errors in 1990 and 5.19% in 2006, with a peak at 8.57% in 1997 (the first determinant with 36.07% of explained variance). We must report that the country effect has increased during this period whereas the pure industry has been comparatively stable or has very slightly increased (from 1.39% in 1990 to 1.75% in 2006 with a peak in 1997 at 2.31% of VT). Another stylized fact for this long period of observation to be mentioned would be the increase in the idiosyncratic effect, from 72.75% in 1990 to 81.63% in 2006 for absolute forecast errors, standing for FAFs accuracy.
Unexplained variance has increased, but firm-specific effects are the most relevant determinants to explain the cross-sectional variance in earnings forecast errors. If pure country-effects vs. pure industry-effects are an unsettled issue to explain portfolios' returns, we have shown that the debate country vs. industry factors to explain FAFs is at least outdated: firms-specific effects are the key but more efforts are to be done in this way.
[Please insert Table 4] 
Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to answer three questions.-1-Is the pure country-effect more important than the pure industry-effect in the explanation of FAFs' accuracy and bias? -2-Are firm-specific effects more relevant to explain FAFs' accuracy and bias around the world? What is the evolution of the relative importance of country-, industry-and firmspecific effects in explaining the cross-sectional variance in FAF errors over the [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] period? Thus, we define the absolute forecast error as FAFs' accuracy, |FEREs|. To analyze firm-specific effects, we focus on two firm-specific factors: earnings-specific factors (profits/losses, and earnings increases/decreases) and analyst following.
Following a methodology initiated by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) for decomposing financial returns into country and industry effects, we adapt it to the analysis of FAF errors.
This framework allows us first to decompose the variances in forecast errors, second to propose a hierarchy of the determinants of the accuracy and bias of FAFs, and finally to provide a better understanding of the differences existing among countries, industries, and firm characteristics as determinants of the performance of FAFs. After the analysis of 224001 observations of FAFs on 13 European markets and 11 industries during the 1990-2006 period, we can give our answers.
First, we explore the dynamic of country vs. industry effects over the 17-years period, and underline sharp contrasts among the 13 countries and 11 industries our sample. We show that pure country-effect systematically dominates the pure-industry effect for FAFs' accuracy. Second, we document that the differences between countries, industries, or coverage by analysts hardly account for the differences seen in forecast errors. The type of earnings -profits vs. losses, and the variations in earnings -increases vs. decreases in earnings-are the main effects to consider in understanding the accuracy and bias of FAFs in our framework. Third, the type of earnings is generally the main driver in explaining the cross-sectional variation of earnings forecast errors, for FAFs' accuracy, while the earnings variation is the second driver over the 1990-2006 period. Another stylized fact for this long period of observation to be mentioned is the constant increase in the idiosyncratic effect from 72.75% in 1990 to 81.63% in 2006.
We can reasonably conclude that the debate country vs. industry factors to explain FAFs on European stock markets is outdated. Firm-specific effects are the main relevant factors even if country-effect has increased. Theses observations could incite regulators to concentrate on loss firm reporting and accelerate accounting harmonization. Our results show that English accounting system tends to provide more accurate forecasts. Moreover, the idiosyncratic effect has been increasing during the period. It encompasses other firm-specific effects and financial analysts' characteristics (qualification, reputation, skill…) we leave for future research. with a forecast horizon of h months before earnings report. We use forecasts made from one to 9 months before earnings report date. 00% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Energy Finance Public Utilities Technology
